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Summary findings
Gatti builds on the altruistic model of the family to  standard (no uncertainty, no asymmetric information)
explore the strategic interaction between altruistic  dynastic model of the family. Alternatively, parents may
parents and selfish children when children's efforts are  choose to forgo any insurance and offer a fixed level of
endogenous. If there is uncertainty about the amount of  bequest, to elicit greater effort from their children.
income the children will realize, and if parents have  The optimal transfers structure that Gatti derives
imperfect information, the children have an incentive to  reconciles the predictions of the altruistic family model
exert little effort and to rely on their parents'  with much of the existing evidence on intergenerational
altruistically motivated transfers. Because of this, parents  transfers, which suggests that parents compensate only
face a tradeoff between the insurance that bequests  partially, or not at all, for earnings differentials among
implicitly provide their children and the disincentive to  their children.
work prompted  by their altruism.  Moreover, Gatti shows that Ricardian equivalence
Gatti shows that if parents can credibly commit to a  holds in this setup, except when non-negativity
pattern of transfers, they will choose not to compensate  constraints are binding.
children in bad outcomes as much as predicted by the
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The dynastic model of the of family first introduced by Barro (1974) and Becker (1974)
explains inter-generational  transfers  as arising from altruistic  behavior.  Parents  care
about  the  utility  of their  children  and  therefore use transfers  to  equalize marginal
utilities  from consumption  among the  members  of the  household.  In this  set-up,
private  transfers  have been shown to neutralize  most  government  inter-generational
redistribution.  This is the well-known Ricardian equivalence.
Because of these important  policy implications,  the  altruistic  hypothesis  has re-
ceived substantial  attention  in the empirical  literature.  In particular,  most  papers
have tested its straightforward implication that  gifts or bequests play a compensatory
role in the family and are directed to the children with  lower income.
The  empirical  support  for the  altruistic  model  has  been mixed.  For example,
Tomes  (1981) and  Laitner  and  Juster  (1996) find  a  strong  negative  relation  be-
tween bequest or preference for bequest and recipient's  income. Wilhelm (1996) and
Menchik (1980) find instead that  the majority of the decedents in their samples divide
bequest equally  among their  children, while large income differentials or diflerences
in gender among siblings make unequal division of bequest more likely.
In this paper we argue that  looking for a strong correlation between bequests  and
recipients' income might lead to misleading inferences about  altruism.  In particular,
we show that,  once children's effort is explicitly made endogenous, it becomes clear
that  parental  altruism  can foster children's laziness:  children might  choose to  work
"too little"  because they  can rely on their parents'  benevolence. If there is potential
2for such  behavior on the  part  of children, parents  might  try  to  protect  themselves
from the consequences of their own love and choose a pattern  of transfers  that  differs
from the one we would expect in a standard  altruistic setting.  In particular,  altruistic
parents  might decide to  use bequests to  provide incentives to their  children to work
hard.  If this  is the case, bequests to children with low income will be relatively lower
(when compared to the standard  altruistic model) and bequests to children with high
income relatively  higher.
To  analyze these  issues, we model the  interaction  between  an  altruistic  parent
who chooses the amount  of resources to transfer to  her child and  a selfish child who
chooses how much to work. We assume that  the child's income is stochastic  and that
the parent  cannot  perfectly monitor  the child's effort.  Uncertainty  and  asymmetric
information introduce  a role for insurance from the parent  and a potential  for shirking
from the child.
We first consider the case when the parent cannot commit in advance to a particu-
lar level, or schedule, of bequests.  In this case the parent  will award bequests  ex post,
based on the realization of the child's income - no matter  whether the realization was
achieved by work or by luck. Here the parent  offers a high degree of insurance to the
child:  a high bequest if the income realization is low, and  a low bequest  if income is
high.
Next, we consider the case where the parent can comrnit to a schedule of bequests.
If she can observe both  effort and income realizations, she will simply offer full insur-
ance but condition  it on the child performing the effort level of the parent's  choosing.
3However, in the asymmetric  information case, where she can observe income realiza-
tions but cannot observe effort choices, she might want to offer transfers strategically,
so as to elicit more effort from the child - even if she has purely altruistic  preferences
which take  into account the  child's cost of effort as well as her  labor income.  As a
result,  the parent  will reduce transfers  to  the  child in bad  occurrences  and increase
transfers  in good occurrences: bequests will be less reactive to income and therefore
provide less insurance than  would be optimal, were effort observable.
It can be argued that  a credible commitment to a bequest schedule conditional on
income realizations  is difficult to sustain.  Instead, parents  might more easily be able
to commit to a single level of bequest.  We show that  even when the parent  restricts
her ability to  provide insurance,  she may still achieve a higher level of utility  than
in the no-commitment  scenario and therefore opt  for a single level of bequest, or for
equally divided bequests  when there  is more than  one child.
Exploring the interaction  between asymmetric information  and commitmenlt sug-
gests that  the  menu of transfers  altruistic  parents  might  choose is richer than  the
simple rule  "give more to  the  child who is worse off".  A parent  who cares only
slightly about  her child might provide such low bequests  as to  have no effect on the
child's behavior.  A credible parent  who is sufficiently altruistic  may want  instead
to use transfers  strategically  and avoid full compensation  in bad states  of the world
in order  to  provide her child with  a  "hard"  budget  constraint.  On the  other hand
a very altruistic/rich  parent  will care so much about  her  child's utility  or wil]L  be so
wealthy that  her child's shirking will not substantially  affect her utility.  In this case
4the parent  will want to use transfers  to provide the child with full insurance.
Such a wide range of potential  behavior suggests that  taking the lack of correlation
between transfers (bequests) and children's income realizations as evidence against the
dynastic  model of the family might be unduly restrictive,  and that  aiming empirical
research at a deeper understanding  of issues of moral hazard  within the family could
be highly rewarding.
The  paper  develops as follows.  Section 1 lays out  a theoretical  background for
the model and presents the standard  altruistic model of the family. Section 2 reviews
some relevant  empirical testing  of altruism  in the family.  Sections 3 and  4 develop
the  model and  characterize the  bequest  patterns  that  parents  might  opt  for under
different assumptions  on information  and  ability  to  make  a credible  commitment.
Section 5 presents  a simple numerical  simulation of the  model.  Section 6 discusses
Ricardian  Equivalence in the  context  of the  model and  presents  evidence from the
numerical simulation.  Finally, section 7 concludes.
2 Theoretical  Background
2.1  The  standard  altruistic  model
Here we will present a simple version of the model of the  family first  introduced  by
Barro  (1974) and Becker (1974) to illustrate  the role of intergenerational  transfers  in
a dynastic family.
Consider the interaction  between an altruistic  parent  and a selfish child. The par-
ent has additively separable concave utility, Up, defined in her personal consumption,
5Cp, and in the consumption of the child, Cc. For simplicity, say
Up  = ln(Cp) + Aln(c,)
where A E (0,1] is the extent  to which the parent  cares about  the child's utility.
The selfish child has utility
U, =  ln(C,)
The budget  constraints  for parent  and  child are Cp <  Ip -B  and  Cc < IC  + B
where 1i are fixed resources and  B is the transfer  from the  parent to  the child.
The parent will choose B so as to equalize her marginal utility from consumption




so that  the  consumption  of a  family member  turns  out  to  be  based  on  a  col-
lective budget  constraint  and  the  distribution  of consumption  within  the  family is
independent  of the distribution  of individual incomes.  Transfers take the form
B=  If, - 1 I  =  AlpI
and therefore  are negatively related to the child's resources.
Both the negative relation between the amount of inter-generational  transfers and
the  recipient's  income,  and  the  sensitivity  of individual  consumption  to  individual
6resources of household members have been empirically tested  to  assess whether the
altruistic model can be taken as an accurate characterization of the interaction  among
members of the household.  A lack of sensitivity of transfers to recipients' characteris-
tics and a significant response of individual consumption to individual income within
the family have been interpreted  as a rejection of the altruistic  model (see next section
for a survey of empirical studies on altruism).
The  simple  model  described  above does not  involve a  role  for an  endogenous
choice of effort on the part of the child, and therefore misses an important  part of the
interaction  between parent  and child. This interaction  is the subject  of the next two
sections.
2.2  Rotten  Kid  theorem
Becker's well-known Rotten  Kid theorem  (1974) introduces a role for strategic family
interactions,  and shows that  under certain conditions, the child's actions will be opti-
mal from the family's point of view, even though  the child has no care for the welfare
of anyone other than himself. As before, the parent's utility  is a linear combination of
the utility  arising from her own consumption and that  of the child, while the child's
utility  depends only on her own consumption
Up  = ln(Cp)  + Aln(Cc),  U, = ln(C,)
Now the income of the parent,  Ip(e), and child, I,(e),  are both  endogenous, rather
than  exogenous, and  specifically are both  taken  to  be functions  of the  effort of the
7child, e.  Note that  Ip(e)  and  Ic(e) both  measure  income net  of cost of effort.  The
budget  constraints  therefore become
Cp<Ip(e)-B  and  C￿<Ic(e)+B
Consider the following interaction:  first, the child chooses effort, then the parent
chooses bequest.  The child knows that  the parent  will, ex post, choose the  bequest
so as to maximize her utility given observed Ip and I,,  and that  the bequest will take
the form
BAI,.(e)  - I.(e)
1+A
The child then chooses e to maximizes U,. Substituting  for B gives U, = ln(  )  +
ln(Ip(e) + Ic(e)) and maximizing over e yields the condition
Ip(e) +  ±I(e)  = 0
Thus the rotten,  selfish child chooses an effort level which optimizes joint family
income.
2.3  A more  general  case  with  endogenous  effort
The Rotten  Kid theorem  depends crucially on the  assumption  that  the parent's  in-
come is a  function  of the child's effort.  This  may apply  in some cases - where the
8child lives with the  parent,  and the fruit  of her labor is a common good, for exam-
ple - but  an intuitively  more attractive  treatment  would take the parent's  income as
independent  of the effort of the child.  Moreover, the Rotten  Kid theorem  effectively
ignores the  cost of effort faced by the child.'
Consider  now the  following example where the  child has separable  utility  over
consumption Cc and effort e. The child's budget constraint  is Cc < we + B, where w
is the wage and B  is the transfer received by an altruistic  parent.  The child's utility
can be written  as
U, = ln(we + B) - b(e)
where  +(e)  is convex cost  of effort.  As before, the  parent  is altruistic  and her
utility  function  Up is separable  in her personal utility  from consumption  and  in the
child's utility, which has weight X. The parent's  income, Ip, is exogenous.
Up  = ln(Ip  - B) + A[ln(we  + B) -(e)]
First,  take  the case where the  parent  is able to  commit to  a set  level of bequest
in advance.  The child will then  choose effort that  equalizes the  marginal cost  and
benefit of working. Effort will be such that:  w  =  +'(e).  Knowledge of this reaction
function informs the choice of bequest which the parent  will promise the child.
Next,  following the  earlier examples  above, let  us  consider the  case where the
'These points were first made by Bergstrom (1989).
9parent  chooses the bequest ex post, after observing the child's effort - perhaps  because
she lacks a credible commitment  mechanism. Again, the bequest takes the form
B  AP - we  (1)
and  thus  is negatively related  to  the  child's  effort and  income.  Knowing this
reaction function, the child will choose effort to maximize U,, yielding the first order
condition for effort
A
W  = ib'(e)
we+B 
Compared to the case where the bequest is committed  in advance, here the mar-
ginal benefit of one extra unit of effort is altered by a factor of  -i-A <  1. The fact that
the bequest  depends  on the effort level modifies the  marginal  benefit  of effort, but
not  its marginal  cost,  and  therefore  creates a distortion  in the effort choice similar
to a tax wedge.  The lower effort chosen by the child will generally make the parent
worse off than  in the commitment case.
Building on this  example, in Sections 4 and  5 we explore the  interplay  lbetween
endogenous effort choice of children and the pattern  of parental  transfers  when there
is a potential  for distorted  effort choices. We explore whether  altruistic  parents have
an  incentive to  protect  themselves from these distortions  and  engineer transfers  to
their children in a manner that  departs  from the behavior predicted by the standard
altruistic  model where parents  fully compensate  for poor  economic performance of
10their  children.
In line with the usual formulation of the dynastic model of the family, we consider
a single-headed household  where the  pater familias  is altruistic.  We also focus on
a one-directional  flow of transfers  from the  parent  to  the  child,  as implied by the
assumption of a selfish child, and consistent with the vast empirical evidence showing
that  resources tend  to flow from the old to the young. 2
The model departs from the standard  set-up in considering a world where parents
have less than  complete information on their children's effort, and study  how parents
set transfers  under  different hypotheses  on their  ability to  pre-commit  to  a specific
transfer scheme.3
Before turning  to the  model, we review the  most recent  empirical  literature  on
altruism.
3 Empirical  Tests  of Altruism  in the  Family
The typical approach  to testing  altruism  is to try  to detect  whether higher transfers
are directed to the children with  lower income in families with multiple  children, as
predicted  by the  standard  formulation  of the  altruistic  model of Barro  (1974) and
Becker (1974).
One of the first empirical studies is due to Tomes (1981). In a random sample of
2See  the discussion  in Becker  (1981)  p.30 2, and in Bergstrom  (1996).
3Kotlikoff  and Razin  (1988)  study transfers  from an altruistic  parent to a child  whose  ability  is
unobservable.
11probated estates  in the Cleveland, Ohio area in 1964-65, Tomes finds strong evidence
that  bequests  are negatively related to recipients'  income. He computes an elasticity
evaluated at the  mean inheritance  of -0.92 suggesting strong evidence in support  of
the altruistic  hypothesis.
Menchik (1980) uses instead  data  drawn from the  probate  records of the Inheri-
tance of the Connecticut State Tax Department.  His sample is particularly  apt for the
study of distribution  rules of bequests, in that the law of Connecticut  does not provide
incentives to alter bequest patterns  across children. The sample includes only estates
of fairly wealthy people ($40,000 or more in 1980 dollars) and also provides (not very
reliable)  information  on the  inter vivos gifts made  by the  testator.  Menchik finds
that,  on a subsample of estates  from families with two or more children  of clifferent
sex, bequests  are mostly shared equally among children.  In 82 families with two chil-
dren of opposite sex, in 60% of cases the children received exactly the same amount,
and in 25% of cases the female received more. His finding is robust to the inclusion of
information on inter vivos gifts. Menchik's results suggest that,  in the majority of the
cases, characteristics  of the  recipient do not  influence the size of transfers  received,
thereby casting strong doubts  on the compensatory  role of bequests.
More recently, Laitner  and Juster  (1996) tested  the altruistic  hypothesis on data
from a sample of 1064 fairly wealthy annuitants  of the TIAA-CREF  retirement  sys-
tem,  The authors  are able to couple information on family assets and demographics
with  answers to  questions on the attitude  of participants  towards  leaving bequests.
Around 50% of the  respondents  maintain  that  leaving an estate  is "quite" or  "very
12important".  Only 21% of the people without  children  think  that  leaving an estate
is important.  Although the  attitude  of childless individuals  is significantly different
from that  of people with children, the difference is narrower than would be predicted
by the altruistic  model. 4
The questionnaire also provides information on how people rank the expected level
of income of their  children relative to their own. Using this  information, the authors
test whether  parents who care about  leaving bequests accumulate  more assets when
they expect  their  children to  do relatively worse than  themselves.  The authors  find
that  the  subsample  of the  "caring"  respondents  do indeed accumulate  more assets
when their  children are expected to have lower income, and they do so all the more,
the  worse is the  expected performance  of their  children.  The  subsample  of people
who do not  care about  leaving an  estate  do not  react  in any significant way to  the
expected performance of their  children.
On the  Estate-Income  Tax  Match data  set,  Wilhelm  (1996) is able  to  test  the
altruistic model of bequest using data  drawn from the extreme upper tail of the wealth
distribution  - the average child's inheritance  in his sample being $238,000. He finds
that  69% of decedents  divide their  estate  exactly equally  among their  children.  He
also finds that  large earning differentials make unequal division of wealth more likely,
although  bequests  provide only a small compensation to  children with low earnings:
his fixed-effects estimates report  that,  in the subsample of parents  who divide their
bequests  unequally,  children whose earnings are $1 below the within-family  average
4Hurd  (1987)  finds  no major differences  in saving  patterns of families  with or without  children.
13receive around  $0.13 more than  the average inheritance  of their siblings.
The work reviewed so far concentrated  on testing the hypothesis  of altruistic  be-
havior on  bequest  patterns.  The  work by  Altonji,  Hayashi,  and  Kotlikoff' (1992)
focuses on  inter vivos transfers  and  uses data  from the  PSID  to  test  the  altruistic
hypothesis in an ingenious way. They test whether own consumption of a family mem-
ber is reactive to  own resources, after controlling for the  combined family resources.
The authors  find that  own resources enter with a positive and  significant coefficient
when regressing food expenditure  on a vector of demographics, own earnings, and a
family fixed effect. Their result is robust  also when the regression is restricted to the
subsample of parents with income above the median and relatively poor children.
Their  test strongly  rejects the standard  implications  of the  altruistic  model that
transfers  are set so as to equalize marginal utilities within the family. In a sense, this
result  is not  surprising,  given the  small amount of transfers  going on in the  PSID:
most families might be at a corner for gifts to their children  after that  they paid for
college tuition,  which is not reported  in the PSID data  set.
In the  following sections, we argue that  the  limited correlation  (or lack thereof)
between transfers  and children's earnings/characteristics  highlighted in the studies of
Menchik (1980), Altonji et al. (1992), and Wilhelm (1996) is consistent with a model
of pure altruism  where children choose unobservable effort and parents  use transfers
strategically to  limit children's shirking.
144 A  Simple  Model  with  Uncertainty
4.1  Preferences
Building on the model presented in Section 2, we now assume that  the income of the
child is stochastic,  depending  on the  state  of the world s  E {H, L}.  The  child can
influence the state  of the world by her effort choice. I restrict  effort to be either high
(eh)  or low (el), with disutility of effort  b(eh) =  Ch >  ?P(ej)  =  cl.  High effort is costly
but  rewarding:  if the child chooses ei =  eh,  she will have a high realization of income
YH  with  probability  7Th and  a low realization  of income YL  <  YH with  probability
(1  - 7Th).  If instead  she chooses the  low action,  the  probability  that  the income is
high is 7r  - 7rh.  To summarize,
YH  with prob.  7rh  and  YL  with prob.  1-  7rh  if e  =  eh
YH  with prob.  7r, and  YL  with  prob.  1-  7r  if e =  el
To make the problem interesting, I assume that  the high income realization can never
be certain, i.e. 7rh  <  1.
The child has concave utility  in consumption  Cc,, and  separable  disutility  from
effort. For simplicity, say
UC,, (ei)  =  ln(CcS)  - (ei)
The budget constraint  of the child is
15Cr,, < Ys + Bs
where BS is the transfer the child receives from the altruistic parent,  and YI' is her
stochastic  income.
The parent  is altruistic and cares about her own personal utility from consumption
Cp,S  and  her child's utility  (including the child's disutility  of effort).  We assume, as
before, that  the child's utility enters parental  utility additively with weight A ,C  (0,1].
The parent's  utility is
UP'. = log(Cp,s,)  + A[log(Cc,,)  - (ej)]
with  budget constraint
Cp,  SI < Ip-Bs
where Ip is fixed parental  income.
In what  follows, we consider the interaction  between parent  and  child under  dif-
ferent hypotheses  on the parent's  ability to observe child's effort and to comrnit to a
specific course of action.
164.2  Full information  with  commnitment
Let  us consider first the  benchmark  case where the  parent  can observe the  child's
action and  can credibly commit to a transfer path.
The timing  of the interaction  is as follows: the parent  calculates  in advance her
expected  utility  under  the low and  high  action to  determine  which action  to  elicit
from the child.  To do so, she takes into account the optimal bequest levels for her to
provide in each case. The assumptions  of perfect observability of effort and credible
commitment  allow her to  dictate  a choice of effort to  the  child under  the threat  of
disinheritance.
In calculating her expected utility  under each action  and state  of the world, the
parent  will choose bequest levels to  maximize
max Up,s  =  log(Ip - Bs)  + A[log(Y 8 + BS)  - (ei)]
subject  to transfers  B,  being non-negative.
The first order condition to this problem is
.= A  + u(YS + BS) for s E {H, L}  (2)
Ip-  B,
where M,,  are the  multipliers  appended  to  the non-negativity  constraints  on Bs.
(2) can be written  in the more familiar form
C's  =1A  + 
1  7where the non-negativity multiplier is redefined as  --  M8Cs  5
If the bequest is operative  (non-zero), the parent  equalizes the  ratio of her mar-
ginal utility  to  the child's marginal  utility from consumption  across states,  thereby
providing full insurance against income fluctuations.  Note that  the level of eflort does
not enter the parent's  first order condition, so that  she will offer a bequest  BH  in the
high state of the world and BL  in the low state irrespective of the child's effort choice.
Given YH > YL,  it follows that  BH  < BL,  i.e. that  more resources are transferred  to
the child in the bad state  of the world.
Knowing  BH  and  BL,  the  parent  can then  calculate  her  full-information  (FI)
expected utility under  the two choices of effort, according to
EUP(ei)  =  '7ri{ln(Ip - BH)  +  A[ln(YH +  BH)  -,(ei)]}
+(l-  7r){ln(Ip  - BL)  + )[ln(YL  +  BL)  - (ei)]}
Say the high action yields the  higher expected utility for the parent,  so
EUFI  (eh)  >  EUFI (el)
Then the parent  will offer the child the following contract:  if e =  eh,  thern B = BH
if s =  H  and B  = BL  if s =  L;  if e  =  el, then  B  =  0 in every state  of the world.
5Note  that  0y5  0 whenever  85  =  0, so that  redefining  the  multiplier  is harmless.
18The child will accept the contract as long as the threat  is credible and the utility
from complying with the parent's  will is higher than  the utility of being disinherited.
In other words, the child will accept the contract,  provided her individual rationality
constraint  is satisfied.
The child's expected utility from opting out of the family is
EU  UT  (e,) = 7ri  log(YH)  + (1- _ri)  log(YL)-  (ei)
As long as EUFl(eh)  > EU.OUT(ei),  the child will accept the contract.
4.3 Asymmetric  information  without  commitment:  the  discretionary  regime
Consider now the case where the parent  cannot observe the child's effort, but only her
income realizations.  Let us also assume that  the  parent  cannot  credibly commit to
any transfer schedule ahead of time.  We will call this case the "discretionary  regime".
The  timing  of the interaction  between parent  and  child is as follows: the  child
chooses unobservable effort, income is realized, the parent  observes income, and finally
chooses bequest levels.
Given the income realization, the parent  will select transfers  to maximize ex post
utility
max Up,,  (ei) -ln(Ip  - B)  + A[ln(Y,  +  B8) -(ej)] B1
19The first order condition for B,  is
YI + B.  A +,y, for s E {H, L}  (3)
Ip-  B.9
where ay is the modified multiplier appended to the non-negativity  constraint.
It is not surprising that  the first order condition for transfers is the same as in (2):
both  in full information and discretion, the ex post parent's  optimal transfer schedule
is the one that  smooths her and her child's marginal utility ratios across states of the
world.
VVhat differs here is the  ability of the  parent  to  elicit the  action  from  the child
which yields her the higher expected utility.  In fact, in the first stage of this game,
the child, knowing how bequests  will be  awarded, calculates  expected  utility under
the high and low action and chooses the more rewarding one. For some valules  of the
parameters,  it can happen  that  the child is ex ante made better  off by choosing the
low action,  while the  parent  would be made better  off by the high  action.  If this  is
the case, the high action is not  incentive compatible and is not  chosen by the child.
If the parent  is able to observe effort and to credibly threaten  disinheritance,  she
can resolve this conflict in her favor. In the next section we will show that,  even when
effort is not  observable, the parent  can engineer her  transfers  strategically  so as to
induce the choice of the high action and obtain  higher utility, provided that  she can
credibly commit to a bequest schedule.
205 A  Principal-Agent  Perspective
In  what  follows, we first  identify  the  instances  where  the  parent  would want  the
child to  enact  the  high  action  but  this  is not  incentive compatible  for the  child in
the  discretionary  equilibrium.  We then  consider how, in the  case where the  parent
cannot  observe the  child's  action but  can credibly  commit to  a transfer  menu, the
parent  chooses bequests  to  offer in the  low and  high states,  in order  to  elicit the
desired action from the child.
We will deal with  each issue in turn.
5.1  Conflict  in  the  family,  or  when  the  principal-agent  framework  can  be
meaningfully  applied
An interesting  case arises when,  under  the  discretionary  regime,  the  parent's  and
child's preferred actions diverge - given the transfers  structure,  the child is better  off
by exerting  low effort, while the  parent  is better  off if the  child works hard.  Note
that  this  divergence can occur even if the parent  is motivated  by pure  altruism  and
does not  put  any paternalistic  weight on the child working hard  per  se. In this  case,
a principal-agent  framework can be meaningfully applied.
The conditions under  which this  conflict arises can be specified as follows.
The child chooses el in the discretionary  regime (D)  if
EU'  (el) > EUC  (eh)  (4)
where EUD  (ei) =  7ri  ln(YH+  BH) + (1-  7ri)  ln(YL  +  BL)-  '(ei),  and BR and BL
21satisfy (3).
The parent prefers the high action in discretion if
EUPD  (6h)  >  EUPD(el)
i.e. if
7rh ln(Ip-  BH)  + (1 - 7rh)  ln(Ip - BL) + AEUf, (eh)
>  7ri  ln(Ip-  BH)  + (1 - ire)  ln(Ip - BL)  + AEUf  (el)
or
(-7rh  - 7r 1 )  [ln(Ip - BH)  - ln(Ip - BL)]  >  -A  (EUf  (eh) - EUr(el))  (5)
The altruistic parent prefers the high action when the marginal benefit in terms of
her personal utility of consumption weighted by (,7rh - 7t 1 )  is greater than the expected
reduction in utility of the child weighted by A.
Since 7rh  >  7r, and BH  < BL  the LHS  of (5) is positive.  If the child herself prefers
the high  action  to  the low action  in the discretionary  equilibrium,  the  RIHS  of (5)
is negative and  the  condition  holds trivially  - the  parent's  and  child's interests  are
unambiguously  aligned.  But  if the  child prefers the low action  in the  discretionary
equilibrium,  (5) becomes a meaningful restriction.
22Note that,  if EU'  (el)  >  EU"  (eh)  is satisfied with  discretionary transfers,  then
EU)  (el) >  EU°UT (eh)  - the individual  rationality  constraint  - holds  as well, due
to  the non-negativity  of transfers,  and  the child has no incentive to  opt  out  of the
family.
5.2  The  committed  transfer  scheme
Let us focus now on the case where (4) and  (5) hold, i.e. the parent  wants to imple-
ment  the high action  while the  child would choose the  low action,  were the  discre-
tionary  regime to  prevail.  Assume now that  the  parent,  though  unable  to  monitor
the  child's action,  can credibly  commit to  a transfer  scheme contingent  on income
realizations.  This is a set-up  analogous to that  of familiar principal-agent  models.
In order to prevent the child from enacting the low action, the parent must engineer
the transfers  so that  choosing the low action becomes less appealing.  Intuitively, she
can achieve that  by lowering the transfers  in the  low state  (offering less insurance)
and increasing transfers  in the good state  of the world (offering an incentive to work
harder).
More formally, if the parent  wants to  elicit the  high action,  she will choose BHc
and  BC so as to maximize her expected utility
max  EUc(eh)  =  rh ln(Ip-BH)  + (1--7rh) ln(Ip-BL) BR ,BL 
+±A(rh  ln(YH  +  BH)  + (1 - 7rh) ln(YL  +  BL)  - eh]
subject  to the incentive compatibility  constraint  of the child
23EUf  (eh) > EUf  (el)
where EUC (e1)  = iri  ln(YH  + BH) + (1  - 7ri) ln(YL  + BL) - V)(ej). The superscript
C indicates the  "commitment  regime".
The first order conditions for this problem are
YH+BH  -=  +V  h 7 rl +YH  (6)
IP-BH  Wh
YL + BL  A  rh-7rl(
A=\-  v  +  'YL  7 IP- BL 1-  7rh
where v is the multiplier associated with the incentive compatibility constraint  and
are the modified non-negativity multipliers.  As is standard  in this type of problems,
the parent  (principal) will want to keep the child (agent) indifferent between the high
and the low action.  As a result, v > o.6
With  v > 0, the  first order  conditions imply that  BC > B D  and  BC < 13D,  with
the sign of equality holding when transfers  are not operative.
Conditions  (6)  and  (7) have an  intuitive  interpretation:  in  order  to  elicit the
high  action  the  parent  must  give up  some insurance  and  therefore  choose a more
61f it were the  case that  v  =  0, transfers under commitment would be the  same as in the
discretionary regime. Given our assumptions, the child would then be better off by choosing  the
low action (and the parent would be made worse off by it)  implying a violation of the incentive
compatibility constraint.
24"compressed" pattern  of transfers than the one she would choose with full information
and commitment - when no moral hazard issue arises - and in the discretionary regime
where the parent gives way to the child. In other words, bequest levels are less reactive
to differences in income realization in good and bad states of the world. Similarly, we
would also expect  bequests to react  less to earning differentials within families with
more than one child.
5.3  A single  committed  bequest
Finally, suppose the parent  cannot  credibly commit to  a schedule of bequests which
responds to income realizations,  but is able to commit to a single level of bequest.  For
example, a child might not find credible a promise of partial  insurance, believing that
the parent  would yield to the temptation  to revert to the full discretion bequest levels
once the income realizations were known; but the same child might instead  believe a
parent  who promises to give a set level of bequest - particularly  if the  promise is to
give the same bequest to all children.  Another  interpretation  of this outcome is that
the parent  might face computational  costs which cause her to  prefer commitment to
a single bequest level rather  than  to a schedule.
This  adds  a further  restriction  to  the  analysis of the  previous  case: that  BH  =
BC = BSC, where SC  stands  for "single level committed"  bequest.  This restriction
must  result  in  the  parent  being worse off than  under  the  full commitment  variant
above, but  - as will be clear from out numerical example - may still result in greater
expected utility for the  parent than  the discretion option.
25In terms of the empirical implications of this setup, to the extent that  opting for a
single level of bequest is a more viable commitment alternative for parents, observing
equal bequests  in families where children have different income patterns  would not
necessarily imply a rejection of altruistic  behavior.
6 A Numerical  Example
A numerical  illustration  can help shed light  on transfer  patterns  under  discretion
and  commitment  when there  is uncertainty  on  the  child's  income  realization  and
asymmetric information.
Consider the model as it was developed in Section 5 and the following  values of the
parameters:  7rh  =  0.8, Ir 1 = 0.2, Ip = 30, YH = 20, YL = 5, O (eh) = 1,  (el) = 0.5.
Table 1 reports  the relevant information for different values of A. Columns 2 and
3 show the transfers  that  the parent  would choose ex post  in the high and low state,
BH and B  D. The non-negativity constraint  on bequests is biting for both  Bf1 and BL
for A  = 0.1, and for BH  alone for 0.2 < A < 0.6. Columns 4 and 5 show the resulting
expected utility for the child under high and low effort. The child's preferred choices
are shown in bold.  Columns 6 and  7 show the  parent's  expected  utility under  high
and low effort, again with their preferred outcome in bold.
For low levels of A, 0.1 < A < 0.3, both the child and parent  have higher expected
utility  under  high  effort, so no conflict of interest  arises.  Here the  parent  does not
care enough about the child to grant a bequest sufficient to influence the child's effort
choice. Nor does a conflict of interest  arise for 0.8 < A < 1, when the parent  gives so
26much weight to the  child's interest  that  this  over-rides the disutility  from giving up
her own consumption  caused by the high levels of bequest.  As a result, both  parent
and child prefer the low action.
However, for 0.4 <  A < 0.7, the child is better  off with  exerting  low effort while
the parent  would want  her to choose high effort, and a conflict of interest  results.  In
other words, under  discretion, the child is able to  call the shots, and  will choose the
low action, forcing the parent to accept a lower expected utility than she would want.
Charts  1 and 2 show the same information graphically.
Table  1:  Discretion
A  BrB  BL  EU.(eh)  EU  (el)  EUD (eh)  EUJ  (el)
0.1  0  0  1.72  1.39  3.57  3.54
0.2  0  0.83  1.75  1.51  3.75  3.68
0.3  0  3.08  1.81  1.77  3.92  3.85
0.4  0  5.00  1.86  1.94  4.11  4.03
0.5  0  6.67  1.89  2.06  4.29  4.23
0.6  0  8.13  1.91  2.16  4.48  4.44
0.7  0.59  9.41  1.95  2.24  4.68  4.664
0.8  2.22  10.56  2.06  2.32  4.88  4.89
0.9  3.68  11.58  2.09  2.38  5.08  5.13
1  5.00  12.50  2.15  2.43  5.30  5.37
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28Results  in table  2 highlight how the parent  can resolve this  conflict of interest  in
her favor if she is able to  commit to  a bequest menu in  advance.  The first section
reports  bequests  and  expected  utility  levels of the  child  and  parent  if the  parent
can commit to  a schedule of bequests  conditional  on income realizations.  BC  and
Bc  solve the  problem set  up in  Section 5 and  are the  transfers  that  maximize the
parental  expected utility for different values of A. Moreover, for the relevant range of
A ([0.4, 0.6]),the spread between BC and BC is lower than the spread between BH and
BL  and  the level of bequest  reacts to  income realization  less than  under  discretion
and thus provides less insurance.  This happens  in order to keep the child's incentive
compatibility  constraint  satisfied. 7
The  parent's  expected  utility  under  the  high  action,  reported  in  column 6,  is
lower than  (or  equal to)  the  expected  utility  under  the  high  action  in  discretion
(table 1, column 6), but is now always attainable,  because the high action is incentive
compatible for the child.
The parent  will opt for the commitment regime only if she gains higher expected
utility than  under  discretion:  these cases, for 0.4 < A <  0.6, are shown in bold.  For
example,  even though  under  discretion  the  parent  would have preferred  the  high-
effort outcome to the low-effort outcome for A = 0.7, she does not choose to commit,
because her expected utility with the low action under discretion  exceeds the reduced
high-effort utility  she would get under  commitment.
7Note that  this is not the case for the range 0.1 < A < 0.3, where, even under discretion, the
child herself prefers the high action.
29Table  2:  Commitment
bequest schedule  single bequest
A  B 2 c  Bc  EUC(eh)  EUC (e,)  EUc (eh)  Bsc  EUSC(eh)  EUSC(eh)
0.1  0  0  1.72  1.39  3.57  0  1.72  3.57
0.2  0  0.83  1.75  1.51  3.75  0  1.72  3.75
0.3  0  3.08  1.81  1.77  3.92  0  1.72  3.92
0.4  0  3.69  1.83  1.83  4.11  0  1.72  4.09
0.5  0  3.69  1.83  1.83  4.29  1.26  1.81  4.26
0.6  0.01  3.70  1.83  1.83  4.47  2.72  1.91  4.45
0.7  1.93  4.53  1.92  1.92  4.66  4.10  1.99  4.65
0.8  3.63  5.27  2.00  2.00  4.86  5.38  2.06  4.85
0.9  5.14  5.93  2.06  2.06  5.06  6.53  2.11  5.06
1  6.50  6.52  2.11  2.11  5.27  6.53  2.11  5.27
Chart  3 illustrates  the parent's  choice between discretion  and commitment.
The  second section of table  2 reports  bequest  levels arising when the  parent  is
able to  commit in advance only to  a single level of bequest.  Here the parent  obtains
lower (or equal)  expected utility  than  when she can  commit to  a schedule, but  for
0.4 <  A <  0.6, she still  obtains  higher utility  than  under  discretion  (table  1, last
column).  She would therefore  choose this  option if it were all that  was avrailable  to
her.
Chart  4 graphs the bequest patterns  arising under the different hypotheses on the
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The solid lines  show  the bequests  resulting  in the discretion case. The gap between
the bequests awarded in the low and high income realizations reflects the insurance
provided to the child by the altruistic parent, subject to non-negativity constraints.
The dotted lines show the  bequests arising under commitment: compared to  the
discretion case, bequests are reduced for the low income realization and increased
for the high realization.  This represents the reduction in insurance necessitated to
prevent the child from choosing  the low action.  Finally the dashed line shows  the
single level of committed bequest which maximizes  the parent's  utility under high
effort, again subject to the requirement that the child does not prefer the low effort
choice. Here the parent is offering  no insurance at all.
31Chart  4: Bequests  under  commitment  and discretion
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7 Ricardian  equivalence
The  stark  implication  of the  standard  altruistic  model of the  family for the  effec-
tiveness of redistributive  policies - summarized in the well known tenet  of Ricardian
equivalence - have drawn much attention  in the theoretical  and empirical literature.
In  the  typical  Ricardian  experiment,  the  governinent  issues one-period  debt to
the  current  generation  and plans  to retire  the  debt  at  a later  date  by raising lump
sum taxes from future generations.  In the standard  altruistic  model, when faced with
the resource transfer implemented by the government, parents re-adjust  their bequest
levels to equalize marginal utilities  from consumption within the family. As a result,
32bequest flows undo the public transfer, which therefore does not produce real effects.'
It is interesting to see whether Ricardian equivalence holds in the altruistic  model
of the family once we allow for endogenous child effort and uncertainty.  A priori we
expect that  Ricardian equivalence should follow in most cases.  In particular,  in the
case of commitment,  Ricardian  equivalence should  hold as long as the  government
transfer does not  modify the incentive compatibility  constraint.
We can easily see the  effects of a  Ricardian-like transfer  in  our setup  by going
back to  the  numerical example.  Let's  assume that  the government  transfers  1 unit
from the young to the old, thereby  raising parental  income, IP, and  lowering child's
income in the high state,  YH, to  19 and  income in the low state,  YL, to 4.
In the  discretion  case, the  parent  chooses to  fully compensate  the  child ex post
and,  by doing so, she re-equilibrates  marginal utilities  across the family in the high
and  low state.  Because of this,  bequest  levels increase  by exactly  1 in  both  states
and completely offset the transfer of resources initiated  by the government.  In other
words, Ricardian equivalence holds.  This of course will happen  only if transfers  are
operative.
The  case of commitment  is not  conceptually  dissimilar  from  the  discretionary
case. Nonetheless, the presence of the non-negativity  constraint  on bequests  and the
additional  incentive compatibility  constraint  complicate somewhat the results.
Again, in most cases in which bequests are operative before the government trans-
fer,  bequests  increase  by  one  unit  to  offset the  government  action.  However, for
8Barro(1974) discusses  the conditions  under which the result holds.
33A =  0.4 and  A =  0.5, when bequests  in the  high  state  are constrained  to  be zero
before and  after the  government transfer,  bequests in the low state  increase by less
than  1.  This  is because of the incentive compatibility  constraint:  were bequests  to
rise by as much as 1, the child would face in the low state  too strong an incentive to
shirk, and would therefore choose the low effort action, to the detriment  of the parent.
In other words,  because the non-negativity  constraint  on the  high-state  bequest in
binding, the incentive compatibility constraint  prevents the bequest in the low state
from rising enough to fully offset the government action.
In  the  case of single bequest,  bequest  increases by  1 whenever positive.  This
is not  surprising,  as Abel  and  Bernheim  (1988) had  already  shown that  Ricardian
equivalence goes through  in  a  deterministic  altruistic  model  where  the  bequest  is
constrained  to be equal across children with different endowment.
We should conclude that,  in principle, Ricardian equivalence holds in the altruistic
model with endogenous effort and uncertainty.  Nonetheless, it is important  to note
that,  non-negativity  constraints  might be,  as in the  standard  model,  an  important
reason for the failure of the equivalence and  for governmental transfers  to  have real
effects.  Moreover, in the  case of commitment,  non-negativity  constraints  combined
with  the  conditions  for incentive compatibility  make  it  such that  the  government
transfer does not translate  one-to-one into an increase in bequest even in the state  of
nature  with operative transfers.
34Table  3:  Ricardian  Equivalence  Experiment
Bequest  with  commitment  Single  bequest
before  after  before  after
A  BC  BL  BH  BC  BSC  BSC
0.1  0  0  0  0  0  0
0.2  0  0.83  0  1.83  0  0
0.3  0  3.07  0  4.07  0  0
0.4  0  3.692  0  4.25  0  0.74
0.5  0  3.692  0  4.25  1.25  2.25
0.6  0.012  3.697  1.012  4.697  2.72  3.72
0.7  1.93  4.53  2.93  5.53  4.10  5.10
0.8  3.63  5.27  4.63  6.27  5.38  6.38
0.9  5.14  5.92  6.14  6.92  6.53  7.53
1  6.49  6.51  7.49  7.51  6.53  7.53
8 Conclusion
We have shown that  once we allow a role for asymmetric information and for endoge-
nous effort choice on the child's side, the altruistic  model of the family is compatible
with diverse patterns  of inter-generational  transfers.  In particular,  if parents are able
to  commit in  advance to  a transfer  schedule, we find  circumstances  in  which they
might  not  fully compensate  poor economic performance  of their  children,  in  order
to elicit more effort from them.  Such partially  compensatory  behavior  on the part
35of parents is consistent with the findings of various recent  empirical studies, such as
Wilhelm's (1996) and Altonji et al.  (1992) that  had put  into discussion the ability of
the standard  altruistic  model to. realistically characterize family behavior.
We also discussed that,  if parents find it difficult to  adhere to  a credible bequest
schedule which responds to  income realizations,  they  might  choose to  commit to  a
single level of bequest.  In this case, parents completely forego the insurance that  they
otherwise could have offered the child in exchange for ensuring that  the child does not
shirk in her effort choice. This would point to bequests being divided exactly equally
among siblings, as emerges from Menchik's (1980) empirical work.
It therefore becomes clear that  most tests  of the dynastic  model of the family are
actually tests  of the joint  hypotheses  of altruism  and discretionary  behavior on the
part  of parents  and that  incorporating  issues of moral hazard  into empirical tests  of
bequest patterns  could be very insightful.  To the extent  that  moral hazard plays an
important  role in the family, we would expect  parents to  be more willing to transfer
resources that  provide actual insurance to their children when luck can be more easily
disentangled from effort - for example, when such occurrences as disability or illness
take place.
This analysis relies on the hypothesis that  parents can credibly commit to bequest
actions in advance.  Per se, such a commitment is not  time  consistent.  However, it
is not  unrealistic to  think that  parents build credibility and,  thus,  ability to commit
to  some transfer  pattern,  either  through  repeated  financial  interaction  with  their
children  or through  setting  behavioral examples  in  other  areas  of interaction  with
36their offspring.  In particular  it seems likely that  a promise of equal bequests  for all
children might more easily be found credible. It  may even be that  society has built
up a "norm"' of equal bequests through  the repeated  play of what at first sight is the
ultimate  one-shot game.
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